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Abstract Inhibition of no-longer relevant go responses
supports flexible and goal-directed behavior. The present
study explored if the interaction between going and stop-
ping is influenced by monetary incentives. Subjects
(N = 108) performed a selective stop–change task, which
required them to stop and change a go response if a valid
signal occurred, but to execute the planned go response if
invalid signals or no signals occurred. There were two
incentive groups: the punishment group lost points for
unsuccessful valid-signal trials, whereas the reward group
gained points for successful valid-signal trials. There was
also a control group that could not win or lose points on
any trials. We found that, compared with the control group,
incentives encouraged subjects to slow down on no-signal
trials, suggesting proactive control adjustments. Further-
more, latencies of valid change responses were shorter in
the incentive groups than in the control group, suggesting
improvements in executing an alternative response. How-
ever, incentives did not modulate stop latency or the
interaction between going and stopping on valid-signal
trials much. Finally, Bayesian analyses indicated that there
was no difference between the reward and punishment
groups. These findings are inconsistent with the idea that
reward and punishment have distinct effects on stop
performance.
Introduction
Response inhibition is a hallmark of executive control,
and receives a great deal of attention across disciplines
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). Cognitive psychologists
and neuroscientists have explored the cognitive and neu-
ral mechanisms of response inhibition, developmental
scientists have studied the ‘rise and fall’ of inhibitory
control capacities across the life span, and clinical
researchers have examined correlations between individ-
ual differences in response inhibition and behaviors such
as substance abuse, overeating, and risk-taking. A popular
task to study response inhibition is the stop-signal task. In
this task, subjects are instructed to respond quickly to a go
stimulus (the go component of the task), but to withhold
their response when a stop signal occurs after a variable
stop-signal delay (the stop component of the task). On
stop-signal trials, performance can be modeled as an
independent race between a go process, triggered by the
presentation of a go stimulus, and a stop process, trig-
gered by the presentation of the stop signal (Logan &
Cowan, 1984); go responses are successfully inhibited
when the stop process finishes before the go process
(signal-inhibit), but are incorrectly executed when the go
process finishes before the stop process (signal-respond;
Fig. 1). Thus, successful stop performance requires a
‘reactive’ system that quickly detects signals and activates
the appropriate stop response. However, optimal perfor-
mance in response-inhibition tasks also requires ‘proac-
tive’ control to find a balance between competing task
demands (i.e. responding quickly vs. stopping; Aron,
2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). In the present study,
we examined how task balance and the race between
going and stopping are influenced by monetary incentives
in a selective stop-change task.
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Many studies have shown that going and stopping are
independent for most of their durations in standard stop-
signal and stop-change tasks (e.g., Logan, 1981; Logan &
Burkell, 1986; Verbruggen, Schneider, & Logan, 2008;
Yamaguchi, Logan, & Bissett, 2012). For example, the
independent horse-race model predicts that mean signal-
respond RT should be shorter than mean no-signal RT,
because the former only represents the mean of those
responses that were fast enough to escape inhibition,
whereas the latter represents the mean of all go responses
(Fig. 1). This prediction has been confirmed by many stop-
signal studies (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). Studies using
stop-change tasks have provided further support for the
independence assumption. In stop-change tasks, subjects
are instructed to cancel the originally planned go response
and execute an alternative ‘change’ response when a signal
occurs. Experimental, computational, and neuro-imaging
works suggest that subjects first inhibit the original go
response and then execute the alternative change response;
furthermore, studies indicate that similar (neural) stopping
mechanisms are involved in simple stop tasks and stop-
change tasks (Boecker, Gauggel, & Drueke, 2013; Cama-
lier et al., 2007; Elchlepp & Verbruggen, 2016; Jha et al.,
2015; Verbruggen et al., 2008). Importantly, in stop-change
tasks, stopping is also not influenced by go processing in
the primary task (Logan & Burkell, 1986) or by the
selection and execution of the change response (Ver-
bruggen et al., 2008), which is consistent with the inde-
pendent race model.
These stop-signal and stop-change findings are intrigu-
ing because most research on multitasking indicates that
central-processing capacity1 is limited, resulting in a per-
formance decrement when two stimuli associated with
different tasks (or task components) are presented in rapid
succession (Pashler, 1994). In other words, there is usually
dependence when two or more tasks overlap. In standard
stop-signal and stop-change tasks, stop and go processes do
not seem to share capacity in this way (i.e. there is
independence).
A different picture emerges when multiple stop signals
are introduced. In selective stop-signal tasks, different
signals are presented and subjects must stop if one of them
occurs (valid signal), but not if the others occur (invalid
signals). Thus, this task introduces a decisional component
to the stop-signal task; as such, it may provide a richer
model of action control than standard stop-signal or stop-
change tasks. Bissett and Logan (2014) found that signal-
respond RT was sometimes longer than no-signal RT in
selective stop-signal tasks, suggesting that selecting the
appropriate response to the signal interacts with ongoing go
processes (violating the assumptions of the independence
race model).2
The ‘dependence’ conclusion was further supported by a
recent study that used a selective stop-change task to
examine the interaction between going and stopping on
signal trials (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). In the primary
task, subjects responded to a go stimulus (Go1 response).
On some trials, a signal occurred. When the signal was
valid, subjects had to stop the Go1 response and replace it
with another response (Go2 or change response). When the
signal was invalid, subjects had to execute the planned Go1
response (they had to ignore the signal). Signal validity was
indicated by a cue at the beginning of a trial. For many
subjects, latencies of Go1 responses on no-signal trials (no-
signal Go1-RT) were shorter than Go1 latencies on valid-
signal trials on which response inhibition failed (signal-
respond Go1-RT) and Go1 latencies on invalid-signal trials
(invalid-signal Go1-RT). This RT pattern was similar to the
pattern observed in selective stop tasks in which subjects
did not have to execute a secondary response (Bissett &
Logan, 2014). However, these findings are inconsistent
with the independent race model, which assumes that going
and stopping are independent for most of their durations
(Fig. 1; Logan & Cowan, 1984). Instead, they suggest that
the decision to stop interfered with go processing. In other
words, going and stopping are dependent and have to share
limited central-processing capacity in selective stop tasks
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2015).
Fig. 1 The independent race in a stop-change task. When the stop
and go processes are independent, only the fastest responses escape
inhibition (Logan & Cowan, 1984). Consequently, signal-respond
Go1-RT should be shorter than no-signal Go1-RT: the former reflects
the mean of the fastest responses that escaped inhibition (i.e. the
responses on the left of the vertical dotted line), whereas the latter
reflects the mean of the whole Go1-RT distribution. See Verbruggen
and Logan (2015) for an elaborate discussion. CSD change-signal
delay, SSRT stop-signal reaction time, which is the covert latency of
the stop process
1 ‘Processing capacity’ can be formalized as a measure of the rate of
processing. A process has limited capacity if its rate decreases as
more processes enter the race (see e.g. Logan, van Zandt, Verbruggen,
& Wagenmakers, 2014). This could be due to competition between
stimulus and response representations (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015).
2 Stop-signal and stop-change studies that have used only one signal
indicate that simply presenting a signal does not slow RTs (i.e. signal-
respond RT is shorter than no-signal RT in most studies).
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The level of dependence (or interaction) between
going and stopping may be influenced by response
strategies. In this context, a strategy is defined as ‘‘an
optional organization of cognitive resources or abilities
that is designed to achieve some goal in some task
environment’’ (Logan, 1985, p. 194). Several strategies
can be used to perform a task, and which strategy is used
at a particular moment can be influenced by voluntary
decisions (e.g. subjects may determine their strategy at
the beginning of a block; see e.g. Strayer & Kramer,
1994) and task-related or environmental factors (e.g.
positive or negative outcomes, or the relative frequency
of certain events). For example, Bissett & Logan (2014)
found that signal-respond Go1-RT did not differ much
from no-signal Go1-RT when most signals were invalid,
but it was shorter when most signals were valid. This
finding suggests that stopping was prioritized more when
most signals were valid: When stopping is fully priori-
tized, the stop process is not influenced much by pro-
cessing in the go task; hence, only the fastest trials can
escape inhibition, as predicted by the independent race
model (see Fig. 1). Research on dual-tasking provides
further support for the idea that task prioritization can be
influenced by strategic and environmental factors. When
two stimuli are presented in rapid succession, prioritiz-
ing the first task leads to serial processing (i.e. central-
processing in the Go2 task only starts when central-
processing in the Go1 task is finished). This is often the
most advantageous processing mode because it reduces
response competition (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Meyer &
Kieras, 1997). But in some situations, overall task per-
formance may benefit from prioritizing both tasks more
equally (Miller, Ulrich, & Rolke, 2009). For example,
the likelihood of equal task prioritization (i.e. central-
processing in the Go1 and Go2 tasks occurs simultane-
ously) increases when there are more short delays than
long delays (Miller et al., 2009).
The present study
In the present study, we examined if the balance or
competition between going and stopping in selective stop
tasks could be influenced by monetary incentives. Previ-
ous work indicates that incentive motivation can influence
performance in standard stop-signal tasks (for a general
review on motivation and cognition, see Braver et al.,
2014). The influence of incentives on performance
depends on how they are delivered or manipulated. In
some studies, reward for successful stops was delivered in
a block-based fashion (i.e. subjects were informed at the
beginning of a block or run of trials that successful stop
performance would be rewarded; see e.g. Greenhouse &
Wessel, 2013; Leotti & Wager, 2010). This incentive
manipulation enhanced stop performance on stop-signal
trials, but slowed responding on no-signal trials. We
observed similar findings in two pilot studies that are
reported in Supplementary Materials:3 when successful
stop/change was incentivized, go responses in the primary
task were slower (despite a strict response deadline), but
performance on signal trials was (numerically) improved.
Combined, these studies indicate that subjects trade speed
in the go task (e.g. by increasing response thresholds or
adjusting attentional settings) for success in the stop task
when successful stop performance is rewarded in a block-
based (or experiment-based) fashion. Note that when go
performance is rewarded, response latencies or accuracy
on no-signal trials tend to decrease and stopping is
impaired (Padmala & Pessoa, 2010). Thus, rewards can
change the balance between going and stopping in both
directions.
Incentives can influence stop performance in other
ways as well. In a series of studies, Boehler and col-
leagues (e.g. Boehler, Hopf, Stoppel, & Krebs, 2012;
Boehler, Schevernels, Hopf, Stoppel, & Krebs, 2014)
showed reward-related information at the moment of the
stop-signal presentation (i.e. the color of the stop signal
indicated whether subjects would receive an extra reward
for successful stop performance or not). They found that
SSRT was shorter and that key regions of the neural
inhibitory control network were activated more on reward
trials than on non-reward trials (for a review, see Krebs,
Hopf, & Boehler, 2016). These findings cannot be
attributed to a simple trade-off between going quickly and
stopping, because the reward signal is presented after the
presentation of the go stimulus. Of course, global atten-
tional and response settings could be influenced by the
occasional delivery of reward; thus, even in the studies of
Boehler and colleagues, proactive control or task settings
could be modulated by reward (Schevernels et al., 2015).
Furthermore, a study by Rosell-Negre et al. (2014) indi-
cates that incentives can influence strategy adjustments
after signal trials. In sum, previous studies indicate that
performance on stop-signal trials in standard stop tasks
(i.e. with only one signal) improves when incentives for
successful stopping are provided, which could be due to
preactivation of the stopping network, control adjust-
ments, or both.
3 These pilot studies were designed to examine the effect of reward
and punishment on reactive control. We found strong effects of
incentives on response-slowing in the primary go task, but only weak
effects on measures of reactive control. Therefore, we decided to
examine the effect of incentives on response-strategy selection and
task prioritization in the present study.
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In the present study, we examined if incentives could
change the balance between going and stopping and the
degree of dependence or capacity sharing in selective stop
situations. We explained the incentive structure at the
beginning of the experiment and it remained the same
throughout the whole experiment. Furthermore, we incen-
tivized stopping only. Based on previous studies, we pre-
dicted that this incentive scheme would encourage subjects
to make proactive strategy adjustments at the beginning of
the task (cf. Strayer & Kramer, 1994). Such adjustments
could influence responding on no-signal trials as subjects
trade speed in the go task for success in the stop task (see
above). Furthermore, we predicted that incentives would
influence the interaction between going and stopping on
valid-signal trials: when stopping is prioritized (due to the
incentives for stopping), it will not be influenced much by
going (i.e. independence); by contrast, when go and stop
processing are prioritized more equally on signal trials,
stopping will be influenced by ongoing go processes (i.e.
dependence).
We included two incentive conditions, namely a reward
condition and a punishment condition. Previous work
suggests that reward and punishment can have distinct
effects on go and stop performance (Guitart-Masip et al.,
2012; Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren,
2014). Furthermore, reward and punishment schemes may
influence strategy selection differently. For example,
Braver, Paxton, Locke, and Barch (2009) found that a
reward scheme encouraged a proactive control mode,
whereas a punishment scheme encouraged a more reactive
control mode.
Even though we were mostly interested in strategy
selection (i.e. how a task is performed) and the balance
between going and stopping, we also wanted to explore the
effects of incentives on reactive control measures (as pre-
vious studies, as mentioned above, found effects of
incentives on both proactive and reactive control). There-
fore, we used a selective stop-change task (instead of a
selective stop task), because it provides us with two mea-
sures of ‘reactive’ action control on valid-signal trials: the
latency of the stop response (stop-signal reaction time or
SSRT) and the latency of the change response (see also
Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). As noted above, the under-
lying response-inhibition mechanisms in stop and stop-
change tasks are very similar. However, SSRT can only be
estimated when the assumptions of the race model are met,
whereas the latency of the change response is measured
directly. In other words, the stop-change task provides an
index of reactive action control even when the assumptions
of the independence race model are violated (and we
expected such violations, especially in the control
condition).
Experiment
In the primary task, subjects responded to a letter (Go1
response). On some trials, a signal appeared on the left or
right of the go stimulus (Fig. 2). When the signal was valid,
subjects had to stop their planned Go1 response and
respond to the location of the signal instead (Go2 or change
response). When the signal was invalid, subjects had to
ignore it and execute the planned Go1 response. Signal
validity was indicated by a visual cue at the beginning of a
trial (Fig. 2). There were three groups. The punishment
group lost points for unsuccessful valid-signal trials. The
reward group gained points for successful valid-signal tri-
als. Finally, the control group could not win or lose points
on any trials.
Incentives may encourage subjects to make proactive
strategy adjustments (see above). Such adjustments often
influence responding on no-signal trials as subjects trade
speed in the go task for success in the stop task (Aron,
2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). Therefore, in a first
analysis, we examined how Go1-RTs on no-signal trials
changed over time in the three groups. We predicted that
incentives on valid-signal trials would encourage subjects
to slow down (i.e. alter their speed/accuracy trade-off).
Note that we focused on Go1-RTs only to get a ‘pure’
measure of proactive control adjustments; after all, stop-
change performance on successful valid-signal trials is
influenced by both proactive and reactive control pro-
cesses. We used a similar analysis approach in our previous
studies that examined proactive inhibitory control (e.g.
Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016; Ver-
bruggen & Logan, 2009a).
In a second analysis, we compared Go1-RTs on no-
signal and failed valid-signal trials to examine the inter-
action between going and stopping on signal trials. We
predicted that the ‘no-signal Go1-RT minus signal-respond
Go1-RT’ difference would be larger in the incentive con-
ditions than in the control condition. When stopping is
prioritized on valid-signal trials, stopping is not influenced
much by going; consequently, signal-respond Go1-RT
should be shorter than no-signal Go1-RT (Bissett & Logan,
2014; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Fig. 1). By contrast, when go
and stop processing are prioritized more equally on signal
trials, stopping is influenced by ongoing go processes;
consequently, the difference between signal-respond and
no-signal Go1-RT should become smaller or even reverse
(Bissett & Logan, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). For
completeness, we also analyzed invalid-signal Go1-RT.
In a third analysis, we analyzed change (Go2) perfor-
mance and explored the correlation between response-
slowing and improvements in change performance. We
also analyzed stop-signal latencies of subjects for which
356 Psychological Research (2018) 82:353–370
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the assumptions of the independent race model were not
violated. Finally, we report an exploratory analysis of
sequential effects in the three conditions.
Method
Subjects
108 volunteers (36 per condition) from the University of
Exeter participated for monetary compensation (£5) or
partial course credit. The number of subjects was deter-
mined in advance, based on a power calculation for the
main effects of interest. As indicated above, effects of
reward on strategy selection and task prioritization could
be tested by comparing RTs for the different trial types. In
our previous study, the RTs correlated strongly (e.g. the
correlation between no-signal Go1-RT and invalid-signal
Go1-RT was r(191) = 0.93, p\ 0.001; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2015). Therefore, a power calculation indicated that
the present experiment was sufficiently powered (0.80) to
detect between–within factor interactions with a small
effect size. Note that for completeness, we also analyzed
change-RTs and SSRTs in the three conditions. However,
we could only detect (very) large effects in these analyses
(with power = 0.80); so, these ‘reactive’ control results
should be interpreted with caution.
p(correct) on valid-signal trials was close to 0.50 for
most subjects in Verbruggen and Logan (2015). Therefore,
we had decided (before data collection had started) to
replace subjects for which p(correct)[0.70 or p(correct)
\0.30 in the present study. Three subjects (control: 1;
punishment: 2) were replaced. We used the integration
method to estimate SSRT (see below); therefore, we used a
more lenient exclusion criterion than the one used for the
mean SSRT estimation method (e.g. Verbruggen, Logan, &
Stevens, 2008).
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure
The experiment was run on a 21.5-inch iMac using Psych-
toolbox (Brainard, 1997). The Go1 stimuli were the letters
‘U’ and ‘D’ (size: approximately 2 9 4 mm). Subjects
responded to them by pressing the ‘up’ (U) and ‘down’
(D) arrow keys of a standard keyboardwith their rightmiddle
finger. The Go1 stimuli were centrally presented in a black
font (Courier) on a light grey background (RGB = 175 175
175). There were four stop-change signals (chequerboards;
size: 12 9 12 mm), which varied along two dimensions: the
number of squares inside the board (3 9 3 or 9 9 9), and the
color (red: RGB = 255 0 0, or blue: RGB = 0 0 255). Sig-
nals appeared approximately 4 cm on the left or right of the
Go1 stimulus. Subjects responded to the location of valid
signals (Go2 or change response) by pressing the corre-
sponding arrowkeywith their right index (left arrow) or right
ring (right arrow) finger.
All trials started with the presentation of a signal cue
(one of the chequerboards) in the center of the screen for
500 ms (Fig. 2). This cue indicated the valid signal, which
could change on every trial. The cue was replaced by a
black fixation cross for 500 ms, after which a letter (the
Go1 stimulus) appeared. Subjects had to decide whether
the letter was ‘U’ or ‘D’. The letter remained on the screen
for 1500 ms, regardless of RT (a similar maximum RT has
been used in previous stop-signal studies).
Fig. 2 Examples of the three
trial types in the selective stop-
change task. The top panel
shows the sequence of events on
no-signal trials (NS). The
middle panel shows the
sequence of events on invalid-
signal trials (IVS), and the
bottom panel shows the
sequence of events on valid-
signal trials (VS). Signal
validity was indicated by the
cue (the centrally presented
chequerboard) at the beginning
of the trial. The arrows under
the letters indicate the correct
response. CSD change-signal
delay. See the ‘‘Method’’
section for further details
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On 1/3 of the trials, a signal was presented on the left or
right of the letter after a variable delay. When the signal
matched the cue (valid signal), subjects had to withhold the
Go1 (up/down) response and respond to the location of the
signal instead (Go2 response; left/right). When the signal
did not match the cue (invalid signal), subjects had to
ignore it and execute the planned Go1 response. Consistent
with our previous research (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015),
the location of the signals was randomized and the four
signals occurred with equal probability in random order.
Thus, only 25% of the signal trials—or 8.33% of all tri-
als—were valid-signal trials, and trial types were fully
randomized. The change-signal delay (CSD) was initially
set at 250 ms and continuously adjusted according to a
tracking procedure to obtain a probability of successful
valid-change performance of 0.50. Each time a subject
responded to the Go1 stimulus or failed to execute the
correct Go2 response on a valid-signal trial, CSD decreased
by 50 ms. When subjects successfully replaced the Go1
response on a valid-signal trial, CSD increased by 50 ms.
Subjects were informed about this tracking procedure and
they were told not to wait for a change signal to occur.
CSD for invalid-signal trials was yoked to the valid-signal
CSD.
At the end of each trial, we presented feedback for
750 ms. On no-signal and invalid-signal trials, we pre-
sented ‘correct’, ‘incorrect’, or ‘too slow’ (in case subjects
did not respond before the end of the trial). The feedback
message on valid-signal trials differed between groups. In
the punishment group, we presented: ‘change: correct’
when subjects successfully replaced the Go1 response, or
‘change: incorrect. You lose 40 points’ when subjects
executed the Go1 (up/down) response or executed an
incorrect Go2 (left/right) response. In the reward group, we
presented ‘change: correct. You win 40 points’ for suc-
cessful valid-signal trials, or ‘change: incorrect’ for
unsuccessful valid-signal trials. In the control group, we
presented ‘change: correct’ or ‘change: incorrect’ for suc-
cessful and unsuccessful valid-signal trials, respectively.
The next trial started after a further 500 ms.
Subjects in the punishment and reward groups were
informed at the beginning of the experiment that the points
would be converted into money (100 points = £0.1) at the
end of the experiment, but only if overall performance on
no-signal and invalid-signal trials was also satisfactory (i.e.
if they responded correctly and in time on the majority of
trials). The start balance was 2500 points in the Punishment
group, and 0 points in the Reward group. There were 64
valid-signal trials in the experiment. Due to the tracking
procedure, both groups ended with approximately 1250
points (£1.25).
The experiment consisted of 768 trials in total. Subjects
received a break after every 64 trials. During the break, we
presented subjects’ mean no-signal Go1-RT, the number of
incorrect and missed no-signal responses, and the per-
centage of correctly replaced responses on valid-signal
trials. Subjects had to pause for 15 s.
Analyses
All data processing and analyses were completed using R.
All data files and R scripts are deposited on the Open
Research Exeter data repository (http://hdl.handle.net/
10871/24540).
Descriptive and inferential statistics appear in Tables 1,
2, 3, 4, 5 and Fig. 3. We also calculated Bayes factors for
all main effects and interaction contrasts in the ANOVA
designs, and present an overview of these analyses in
Supplementary Materials. Part (first half vs. second half of
the experiment) was included in the analyses, because go
performance may gradually change over time in the
incentive conditions (Leotti & Wager, 2010). Furthermore,
reward and punishment can influence learning in response-
inhibition tasks (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; but see also
Krebs et al. (2016), for a discussion of reward and practice
effects).
For the reasons discussed above, we focused primarily
on Go1-RTs in the analyses reported below. For com-
pleteness, we analyzed latency of the stop response (SSRT)
and the change response on successful valid-signal trials as
performance on these trials could be influenced by changes
in reactive control, proactive control, or both. We calcu-
lated SSRT using the integration method (Verbruggen,
Chambers, & Logan, 2013). To account for response-
slowing, we calculated SSRT for each part separately, and
then took the average (as recommended in Verbruggen
et al., 2013). The independent race model assumes that
stopping and going are independent for most of their
durations. This assumption should not be taken lightly,
because SSRT cannot be reliably estimated when it is
violated. Therefore, we compared signal-respond Go1-RT
with no-signal Go1-RT for each subject and part, and
excluded subjects when signal-respond Go1-RT was longer
than no-signal Go1-RT in part 1, part 2, or both. We had to
exclude 46 subjects in total. The number of subjects per
group appears in Table 4.
We also performed an exploratory sequential analysis in
which we compared no-signal performance on trials that
followed a correct no-signal trial, a correct invalid-signal
trial, an unsuccessful (signal-respond) valid-signal trial, or
a successful (signal-inhibit) valid-signal trial. There were
not enough incorrect no-signal and invalid-signal trials to
explore how Go1 errors influenced subsequent perfor-
mance. For similar reasons, we could not explore how
sequential effects influenced performance on invalid- and
valid-signal trials. Measurements of post-signal slowing
358 Psychological Research (2018) 82:353–370
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can be contaminated by global fluctuations in performance
over the course of an experiment (Nelson, Boucher, Logan,
Palmeri, & Schall, 2010). For example, when RTs gradu-
ally become longer in a block, probability of stopping will
temporarily decrease (as the tracking procedure may need
some time to catch up). This will also influence the mea-
surement of post-signal slowing, because trials that follow
a successful stop are more likely to come from slower parts
of the block or experiment than trials that follow an
unsuccessful stop. There is a solution for this problem:
post-signal slowing can be quantified as the RT difference
between the post-signal trial and the last preceding no-
signal trial (Nelson et al., 2010; see Dutilh et al., 2012 for a
similar solution to control for global fluctuations in post-
error paradigms). For example, when a no-signal trial (trial
n) was preceded by another no-signal trial (trial n - 1), the
RT difference is ‘RT trial n’ minus ‘RT trial n - 1’. If trial
n-1 was an invalid-signal trial but trial n - 2 was a no-
signal trial, the RT difference is ‘RT trial n’ minus ‘RT trial
n – 2’.
Finally, we report the descriptive and inferential statis-
tics for the accuracy data of the go task in ‘‘Appendix 1’’.
The accuracy data for the change task appear in Table 3.
Note that we used a tracking procedure to determine the
change-signal delay (like most stop-signal and stop-change
studies; see Verbruggen et al., 2013). This procedure typ-
ically results in a p(respond|signal) & 0.50, and compen-
sates for individual or group differences in go or stop
latencies. Therefore, incentives were not expected to
influence the probability of executing the primary-task
response on valid-signal trials. However, they could
influence the latency of the change response and SSRT.
Table 1 Overview of the
analyses of variance
Analysis df1 df2 SS1 SS2 F p ggen
2
No-signal Go1-RT
Group 2 105 190,054 7,118,477 1.402 0.251 0.024
Part 1 105 242,421 704,151 36.149 <0.001 0.030
Group by part 2 105 54,819 704,151 4.087 0.020 0.007
Signal-respond vs. no-signal Go1-RT
Group 2 105 347,529 12,729,865 1.433 0.243 0.024
Part 1 105 333,233 1,180,176 29.648 <0.001 0.023
Trial type 1 105 183,236 297,773 64.612 <0.001 0.013
Group by part 2 105 79,230 1,180,176 3.525 0.033 0.005
Group by trial type 2 105 1327 297,773 0.234 0.792 0.000
Part by trial type 1 105 12,088 175,807 7.219 0.008 0.001
Group: part: trial type 2 105 2851 175,807 0.851 0.430 0.000
Invalid-signal vs. no-signal Go1-RT
Group 2 105 389,550 14,400,830 1.420 0.246 0.024
Part 1 105 222,712 1,237,161 18.902 <0.001 0.014
Trial type 1 105 847,767 176,208 505.174 <0.001 0.051
Group by part 2 105 96,683 1,237,161 4.103 0.019 0.006
Group by trial type 2 105 70 176,208 0.021 0.979 0.000
Part by trial type 1 105 50,348 80,366 65.780 <0.001 0.003
Group: part: trial type 2 105 1011 80,366 0.661 0.519 0.000
Change-RT
Group 2 105 264,002 2,094,082 6.619 0.002 0.099
Part 1 105 257,662 315,288 85.809 <0.001 0.097
Group by part 2 105 3886 315,288 0.647 0.526 0.002
Go1-RT difference (sequential analysis)
Group 2 105 3025 244,491 0.650 0.524 0.004
Properties previous trial 3 315 194,837 575,693 35.536 <0.001 0.192
Group by previous trial 6 315 14,623 575,693 1.333 0.242 0.018
Latencies were analyzed by means of mixed ANOVAs with group (control, punishment, reward) as a
between-subjects factor, and part (first half. vs. second half of the experiment) as within-subjects factor. For
the ‘invalid-signal vs. no-signal’ and ‘signal-respond vs. no-signal’ analyses, we also included trial type as
a within-subjects factor. For the sequential analysis, we analyzed the Go1-RT difference between trials as a
function of the properties of the previous trial (correct no-signal, correct invalid-signal, unsuccessful valid-
signal, or successful valid-signal trial). p’s\ 0.05 are in bold
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Results
No-signal Go1-RT
No-signal Go1-RT increased substantially from the first
half to the second half of the experiment in the punishment
group (part 1: M = 746 ms; part 2: M = 830 ms; differ-
ence: p\ 0.001, BF = 739) and reward group (part 1:
M = 774 ms; part 2: M = 868 ms; difference: p\ 0.001,
BF = 169), but not in the control group (part 1:
M = 737 ms; part 2: M = 760 ms; difference: p = 0.214,
BF = 0.374). The group by part interaction was
significant, p = 0.020 (Table 1). None of the other
between-group differences was statistically significant after
correction for multiple comparisons (Table 2).
No-signal RTs were generally long (considering the
simplicity of the primary up/down task). This suggests that
dual-task demands (i.e. updating and maintaining the rel-
evant signal rule in working memory and monitoring for
the signal) and response-strategy adjustments influenced
performance in all groups, including the control group
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). However, the group by part
interaction indicates that incentives encouraged subjects to
slow down even more throughout the experiment.
Table 2 Overview of planned comparisons to explore the Group by
Part interaction for the latencies in the primary task (first and second
set of comparisons), the main effect of group for latencies of the
change response and stop response on valid-signal trials (the third set
and fourth of comparisons), and the main effect of ‘previous trial
properties’ in the sequential analysis (fifth set of comparisons)
Comparison Diff Lower CI Upper CI df t p BF g
No-signal Go1-RT: within-group differences
Control: part 1 vs. part 2 -22 -58 13 35 -1.267 0.214 0.374 0.126
Punish: part 1 vs. part 2 -84 -119 -48 35 -4.788 0.001 739.642 0.434
Reward: part 1 vs. part 2 -95 -140 -49 35 -4.244 0.001 169.169 0.467
No-signal Go1-RT: between-group differences
P1: control vs. punish -9 -81 62 70 -0.258 0.797 0.25 0.06
P1: control vs. reward -36 -109 36 70 -1.003 0.319 0.374 0.234
P1: punish vs. reward -27 -100 46 70 -0.741 0.461 0.308 0.173
P2: control vs. punish -71 -172 31 70 -1.392 0.168 0.556 0.325
P2: control vs. reward -109 -214 -3 70 -2.059 0.043 1.462 0.48
P2: punish vs. reward -38 -149 73 70 -0.681 0.498 0.297 0.159
Change-RT: between-group differences
Control vs. punish 67 18 117 70 2.73 0.008 5.458 0.636
Control vs. reward 79 31 128 70 3.271 0.002 19.885 0.763
Punish vs. reward 12 -31 55 70 0.561 0.576 0.278 0.131
SSRT: between-group differences
Control vs. punish 19 -19 58 37 1.023 0.313 0.471 0.321
Control vs. reward 31 -3 65 40 1.806 0.078 1.093 0.549
Punish vs. reward 11 -22 44 41 0.678 0.502 0.362 0.203
No-signal RT difference: property of previous trial
No-signal vs. invalid -39 -45 -33 107 -13.191 <0.001 1.14 9 1021 2.300
No-signal vs. signal-respond -57 -70 -44 107 -8.641 <0.001 1.19 91011 1.553
No-signal vs. signal-inhibit -45 -57 -32 107 -7.210 <0.001 1.08 9108 1.294
Invalid vs. signal-respond -17 -29 -5 107 -2.765 0.007 3.916 0.403
Invalid vs. signal-inhibit -5 -17 7 107 -0.861 0.391 0.153 0.129
Signal-respond vs. signal-inhibit 12 0 24 107 1.925 0.057 0.630 0.199
p’s\ 0.05 after Holm–Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons are in bold
The Bayes factor (BF) is an odds ratio: it is the probability of the data under one hypothesis relative to that under another. Evidence categories for
Bayes factor: BF\ 0.33 = substantial evidence for H0; 1/3 - 1 = anecdotal evidence for H0; 1 = no evidence; 1–3 = anecdotal evidence for
HA; 3 - 10 = substantial evidence for HA; BF[ 10 = strong to decisive evidence for HA. H0 = no difference between the trial types; HA = a
difference between the trial types. We calculated the Bayes factors with the Bayes factor package in R, using the default prior (0.707). For the
SSRT analysis, we excluded subjects whose signal-respond RT was longer than their no-signal RT
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Signal-respond vs. no-signal Go1-RTs
The independent race model assumes independence
between going and stopping; so, mean signal-respond RT
(i.e. RTs for trials on which a valid signal was presented
but subjects executed the up/down Go1 response instead of
the left/right Go2 response) should be shorter than mean
no-signal RT (see Fig. 1). The model does not make any
further assumptions about whether the executed response
should ‘match’ the stimulus (i.e. up for ‘U’ and down for
‘D’) or not. Therefore, we included all executed Go1
responses for this analysis (including trials when subjects
pressed ‘up’ for D and down for ‘U’; see also Verbruggen
& Logan, 2015). Note that we have repeated the analysis
after exclusion of non-matching responses, but this did not
alter the main findings (see Supplementary Materials).
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 3. Consistent with
the independent race model, signal-respond Go1-RT was
on average 41 ms shorter than no-signal Go1-RT (main
effect of trial type: p\ 0.001). However, Figure S1 in
Supplementary Materials shows that the independence
assumption was violated for approximately 25–30% of the
subjects in each group. In other words, for these subjects,
we observed dependence or competition between going
and stopping. This is consistent with our previous research
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2015) and the findings of Bissett
and Logan (2014). Importantly, the Go1-RT difference was
similar in the three groups (control: 39 ms, punishment:
Table 3 Overview of performance on valid-signal trials: probability
of responding on a valid-signal trial [p(respond)], average valid
change-signal delay (CSD), average reaction time for Go1 responses
on signal-respond trials (signal-respond Go1-RT), the difference
between signal-respond Go1-RT and no-signal Go1-RT (both correct
and incorrect responses were included when mean no-signal RT was
calculated), and average reaction time for correct Go2 responses
(change-RT), as a function of part (first vs. second half of the
experiment) and group (control, punishment, reward)
Independent variables p(respond) CSD Signal-respond Go1-RT No-signal Go1-RT minus signal-respond Go1-RT Change-RT
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Part 1
Control 0.386 0.102 380 135 703 136 35 69 693 131
Punish 0.402 0.097 388 141 723 152 23 75 631 99
Reward 0.367 0.124 431 149 742 177 34 76 624 99
Part 2
Control 0.496 0.100 449 234 717 171 42 57 634 113
Punish 0.469 0.070 544 265 776 200 54 62 562 101
Reward 0.452 0.072 606 273 809 212 59 63 544 96
Change-RT corresponds to the time interval between the presentation of the valid signal and the left/right key press. Mean probability of not
executing any response on valid-signal trials was 0.02 (SD = 0.13)
Table 4 Overview of the number of subjects and stop performance
on valid-signal trials after exclusion of subjects whose signal-respond
RT was longer than their no-signal Go1-RT (see ‘‘Analyses’’ section
for further details): probability of responding on a valid-signal trial
[p(respond)], average valid change-signal delay (CSD), stop-signal
reaction time (SSRT)
Group N p(respond) CSD SSRT
M SD M SD M SD
Control 19 0.41 0.11 486 206 269 76
Punish 20 0.40 0.08 568 201 249 69
Reward 23 0.39 0.10 597 212 238 59
For this subset of subjects, mean probability of not executing any
response on valid-signal trials was 0.04 (SD = 0.05)
Table 5 No-signal RT difference as a function of the previous trial and group
Group No-signal Invalid-signal Signal-respond (unsuccessful valid) Signal-inhibit (successful valid)
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Control -13 12 22 25 57 67 27 57
Punish -14 10 30 21 43 52 40 50
Reward -12 11 27 24 30 64 28 66
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39 ms, reward: 46 ms; interaction group by trial type:
p = 0.792). This conclusion was further supported by the
Bayesian analyses (Supplementary Materials). Thus,
incentives did not influence the dependence between going
and stopping (or task prioritization) on valid-signal trials.
After all, the difference between signal-respond RTs and
no-signal RTs should have been larger when stopping was
prioritized more.
The significant interaction between part and trial type
(p = 0.008; Table 1) indicates that the signal-respond/no-
signal difference increased throughout the experiment (part
1 = 31 ms; part 2 = 52 ms). The group by part interaction
(p = 0.033) was the only significant group-related effect,
and provides further support for the idea that RTs generally
increased throughout the experiment in the incentive
conditions.
Invalid-signal vs. no-signal Go1-RTs
Go1-RTs were generally longer on invalid-signal trials
(875 ms) than on no-signal trials (786 ms), which is
consistent with previous research (Bissett & Logan,
2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). The significant
interaction between trial type and part (p\ 0.001;
Table 2) indicates that this difference decreased
throughout the experiment (part 1: 110 ms; part 2:
67 ms). Importantly, the Go1-RT difference was similar
in the three groups (control: 87 ms; punishment: 89 ms;
reward: 89 ms; group by trial type interaction:
p = 0.979), and was observed for all subjects (Fig-
ure S1). The outcomes of the Bayesian analysis and the
ANOVA were consistent. Thus, the ‘invalid-signal vs.
no-signal’ comparison indicates that incentives did not
influence how subjects processed invalid signals. The
corresponding RT distributions (see Supplementary
Materials) further supported this conclusion.
Performance on valid-signal trials
Change-RT (the latency of correct Go2 responses) was
measured directly, so violations of the independence
assumption (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015) and strategic
slowing (Verbruggen et al., 2013) were not a concern. As
can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, change-RTs were longer in
the control group than in the punishment (differ-
ence = 67 ms; p = 0.008, BF = 5.458) and reward (dif-
ference = 79 ms; p = 0.002, BF = 19.885) groups. There
was no difference between the incentive conditions
(p = 0.576; BF = 0.278). Thus, incentives reduced the
latency of change responses. Change-RT decreased with
practice, but the Group by Part analysis was not significant
(Table 1), indicating that incentives did not enhance
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practice effects (for a similar finding in a simple stop task,
see Boehler et al., 2014; see also Krebs et al., 2016).
The no-signal RT analyses indicate that incentives
encouraged subjects to slow down the primary-task
response throughout the experiment (i.e. they made extra
proactive control adjustments). We tested whether these
adjustments influenced change-RTs. We correlated
response-slowing in the primary go task (i.e. no-signal RT
part 2 minus no-signal RT part 1) with stop-change per-
formance (i.e. change-RT part 2 minus change-RT part 1).
We found a negative correlation: when Go1-RT increased
throughout the experiment, change-RT decreased,
r(107) = -0.43, p\ 0.001. Interestingly, this negative
correlation was observed in each group (Fig. 4). Thus,
proactive control adjustments influenced performance on
valid-signal trials, even when no extrinsic incentives were
provided.
As can be seen in Table 4, there were small numerical
SSRT differences between the groups. However, these
differences were not statistically significant, and the Bayes
factors were inconclusive (Table 2). It could be argued that
no SSRT differences were observed because the sample
size was further reduced compared with the change-RT
analyses. Therefore, we also analyzed change-RT after
exclusion of those subjects for which the independence
assumption of the race model was violated. There were still
large change-RT differences between the incentive groups
and the control group (‘‘Appendix 2’’). In other words, the
change-RT pattern was not influenced much by the
exclusion of subjects whose signal-respond RT was longer
than their no-signal RT.
We found no reliable effects of reward and punishment
on SSRT in this experiment. In pilot experiment 2 (see
Supplementary Materials), in which we used a stop-signal
task with only one signal, we also found no reliable effects
of reward and punishment on SSRT after correction for
multiple comparisons, and the Bayesian analyses were
inconclusive. However, we observed some numerical
trends that were consistent with the trends observed here
and differences observed in previous studies (e.g. Boehler
et al., 2012; Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013). Therefore, we
combined the results of the main experiment and the pilot
experiment by calculating meta-analytic Bayes factors for
multiple t tests (Rouder & Morey, 2011). This meta-anal-
ysis revealed that reward had some beneficial effect on
SSRT (BFmeta for reward vs. control = 5.11). The pun-
ishment vs. control comparison was still inconclusive
(BFmeta = 0.65), whereas the reward vs. punishment
comparison provided substantial support for the null
hypothesis (BFmeta = 0.14). In sum, we can conclude that
the incentives (and reward in particular) can have a bene-
ficial effect on stop latencies, but large sample sizes are
required to detect these differences. Because SSRT has to
be estimated, it may be a noisier measure than go latencies,
which can be measured directly.
Sequential effect of signal presentation
The results of the experiment suggest that reward and
punishment influenced the response strategies. In a final
exploratory analysis, we tested if incentives also influenced
post-change-signal performance. In standard stop-signal
tasks, response latencies are often slower after stop-signal
trials than after no-stop-signal trials (Bissett & Logan,
2011, 2012; Nelson et al., 2010; Rieger & Gauggel, 1999;
Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2008;
see also Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c, for a similar
observation in a stop-change task with only one signal).
Bissett and Logan (2011) contrasted several accounts of
post-stop-signal slowing, and found most support for a
r = −0.39 r = −0.41 r = −0.47
Control Punishment Reward
−400
−200
0
200
−200 0 200 400 −200 0 200 400 −200 0 200 400
no−signal RT: Part 2 minus Part 1
ch
an
ge
 R
T:
 P
ar
t 2
 m
in
us
 P
ar
t 1
Fig. 4 Correlation between the response-slowing on no-signal trials
(no-signal Go1-RT: part 2 minus part 1) and improvements in change-
RT on valid-signal trials (change-RT: part 2 minus part 1). A negative
correlation indicates that subjects who slow more over time show
greater improvements in change-RT
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strategic adjustment account that proposes that stop-signal
presentation encourages subjects to shift priority from the
go task to the stop task. Such a shift produces longer
response latencies after a signal trial and can reduce SSRT
when the stop-signal modality remains the same (Bissett &
Logan, 2012; for similar improvements in stop latencies in
continuous variants of the stop-signal task, see Morein-
Zamir, Chua, Franks, Nagelkerke, & Kingstone, 2007;
Verbruggen & McLaren, 2016). Findings of Rosell-Negre
et al. (2014) indicate that incentives can influence strategy
adjustments after signal trials. Therefore, we also com-
pared no-signal performance on trials that followed a cor-
rect no-signal trial, a correct invalid-signal trial, an
unsuccessful (signal-respond) valid-signal, or a successful
(signal-inhibit) valid-signal trial. As discussed in the
‘‘Analyses’’ section, post-change-signal slowing was
quantified as the RT difference between the post-signal
trial and the last preceding no-signal trial. Positive scores
indicate that subjects are slower than on the previous no-
signal trial; negative scores indicate that they were faster.
The descriptive statistics appear in Table 5. A univariate
analysis revealed that properties of the previous trial
influenced no-signal RT, but there was no main effect of
group (control, reward, or punishment) or a group by trial
type interaction (Table 1). In other words, incentives did
not modulate sequential effects in our study. This conclu-
sion was further supported by Bayesian ANOVA (see
Supplementary Materials). To explore the main effect of
trial type in more detail, we performed a series of post hoc
tests. These appear in Table 2. As can be seen, no-signal
RTs were generally longer after both valid- and invalid-
signal trials than after no-signal trials (see also Table 5).
There was no difference between trials that followed
invalid-signal trials, unsuccessful valid-signal trials, or
valid-signal trials. In other words, stop-signal presentation
generally slowed responding on the subsequent trial, which
seems consistent with the strategic adjustment account of
Bissett and Logan (2011). Note that previous studies have
also shown that the slowing is more pronounced when
features of the previous trial are repeated (e.g. Verbruggen
et al., 2008); unfortunately, we could not test this here
because the number of valid-signal trials was too low.
General discussion
Incentives induce general slowing
but do not influence the competition between going
and stopping on signal trials
No-signal Go1-RTs increased more throughout the exper-
iment in the reward and punishment groups than in the
control group. The slowing in both groups can be attributed
to extra ‘proactive inhibitory control’ adjustments. When
subjects expect a stop signal, they monitor the environment
and selectively attend to stop-signal features (e.g. Elchlepp
et al. 2016), and downregulate attentional resources in the
go task (e.g. Langford, Krebs, Talsma, Woldorff, &
Boehler, 2016). Furthermore, proactive inhibitory control
can involve adjustments of response-selection thresholds
and suppression of motor output to trade speed in the go
task for success in the stop task (e.g. Aron, 2011; Ver-
bruggen & Logan, 2009a). The findings of the present
study indicate that providing monetary incentives encour-
aged subjects to make such strategic adjustments4 (i.e.
subjects in the incentive conditions approached the task
differently).
Second, we explored if incentives influenced the
dependence between going and stopping on valid-signal
trials. Bissett and Logan (2014) found that the ‘no-signal
minus signal-respond’ RT difference increased when the
proportion of valid signals increased. Thus, the higher
proportion of valid signals encouraged the subjects to pri-
oritize stopping (i.e. stopping was less influenced by pro-
cessing in the primary go task). We expected that
incentives on valid-signal trials would have a similar
effect. To our surprise, they did not: average signal-re-
spond Go1-RT was shorter than no-signal Go1-RT in the
three groups, but there were no statistically significant
group by trial type differences (note that this study was
sufficiently powered to detect small-effect-sized interac-
tions; see Supplementary Materials). Furthermore, we
found that signal-respond Go1-RT was longer than no-
signal Go1-RT for a similar subset of subjects in all groups
(Figure S1). Finally, we observed similar ‘no-signal vs.
invalid-signal’ Go1-RT differences in the three groups.
Combined, these findings indicate that signal processing
was not influenced by reward or punishment.
It is possible that the high proportion of invalid-signal
trials discouraged subjects from prioritizing the stop task
on signal trials (Bissett & Logan, 2014). However, this did
not discourage them from generally slowing down their
Go1 responses, as indicated by the no-signal trial analyses.
In other words, our incentive manipulation encouraged
subjects to change attentional and/or response settings in
the primary go task, but they could not change the level of
competition between going and stopping on signal trials.
Slowing of all Go1 responses may be the ‘default’ strategy
4 In previous studies, we fitted the diffusion model or the linear
ballistic accumulator model to our data to determine which processing
parameters were adjusted when subjects expected a stop signal to
occur (Jahfari et al., 2012; Logan et al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan,
2009a). In this study, we could not fit such a model to the no-signal
data of the individual subjects, because the number of trials was
relatively low and some subjects did not make any errors (which
caused further problems for the fitting).
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when stopping is incentivized or when subjects expect a
signal in the near future (e.g. when a traffic sign informs
car drivers that they are near a school or playground, they
slow down; they do not wait until they see children
crossing the road to adjust their driving). Future proactive
inhibitory control studies should further explore which
factors influence strategy selection (including the opti-
mality of various response strategies; see e.g. Miller et al.,
2009).
Alternative explanations for the response-slowing
We propose that slowing on no-signal trials reflects
proactive control adjustments.
It is unlikely that the Go1-RT group differences reflec-
ted increased dual-task demands. After all, accuracy on no-
signal trials should also be influenced by dual-task
demands. As can be seen in the Appendix, go accuracy was
similar for all groups.
The slowing could also be due to the retrieval of
stimulus–stop associations. Several studies have indicated
that responding on no-signal trials is slowed when stimuli
or stimulus features of previous stop trials are repeated
(e.g. Bissett & Logan, 2011; Rieger & Gauggel, 1999;
Verbruggen et al., 2008; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b).
This stimulus-specific slowing has been attributed to the
retrieval of stimulus–stop associations: a go stimulus
becomes associated with a ‘stop’ representation on a stop
trial; when it is repeated on a following no-signal trial, the
stop representation is activated via memory retrieval, and
this will suppress the go response or interfere with
responding (Verbruggen et al., 2014; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2008b). On valid-signal trials, the retrieval of such
associations would improve stop performance. Guitart-
Massip et al. (2012) demonstrated that associative learn-
ing in response-inhibition tasks could be influenced by
incentives. Thus, in the incentive conditions, the retrieval
of stimulus–stop or signal–stop associations could have
had a bigger impact on performance than in the control
condition.
As mentioned in the sequential analysis section, we
could not examine the contribution of stimulus–signal
associations directly. Nevertheless, we think that it is
unlikely that incentive-induced changes in associative
mechanisms can account for group differences in response-
slowing on no-signal trials. Subjects only had to stop and
change their response on a very small proportion of the
trials (i.e. 8.3% of all trials). Thus, the go stimuli should
have become associated with going rather than stopping
(hence, Go1-RTs should have decreased throughout the
experiment; instead, they increased). It seems also unlikely
that altered performance on signal trials was influenced
much by incentive-induced changes in memory retrieval or
associative learning. The signal mapping changed con-
stantly; consequently, the signal of the previous valid sig-
nal was repeated only on a small minority of the signal
trials. Furthermore, the signal-respond Go1-RT data are
inconsistent with a memory-retrieval account. After all,
this account makes the same prediction as the task priori-
tization account: when the stop response is strongly acti-
vated, only the fastest trials can escape inhibition. We
already explained above that our data were inconsistent
with this idea. Finally, we found that the difference
between no-signal and invalid-signal trials decreased
throughout the experiment. An associative account predicts
the opposite.
Another alternative account for our findings is that the
response-slowing is due to a gradual build-up of slowing
caused by ‘reactive’ control adjustments after the presen-
tation of a signal (see e.g. Bissett & Logan, 2011).
Separating the proactive control account and the ‘build-up’
account is difficult in the present study because the
incentive manipulation was block-based. However, it
seems unlikely that the slowing is entirely due to post-
change-signal adjustments. In the sequential analysis, we
found that responding was slowed down after the presen-
tation of an invalid or valid change signal, but this slowing
was comparable for the three groups. Thus, a post-change-
slowing account cannot explain the group differences
observed in the main analyses.
In sum, the group differences cannot easily be explained
by a pure memory-retrieval account or a post-change-sig-
nal adjustment account. We cannot rule out some minor
contribution of associative or memory-retrieval mecha-
nisms and post-change-signal adjustments, but it seems that
the slowing on no-signal and signal trials is primarily due
to strategy adjustments and competition between decisional
processes in the go and stop tasks.
Effect of incentives on change latencies
The change-RT analysis showed that stop-change perfor-
mance was better in the reward and punishment groups
than in the control group. This improvement could be due
to proactive control adjustments (see above). Incentives
could also have had a more direct effect on reactive con-
trol. Previous work suggests that incentives can increase
activity in the reactive inhibitory control network (Boehler
et al., 2014). However, our Go1-RT analysis suggests that
the decision to stop or not was not influenced much by
incentives (i.e. we observed similar differences between
no-signal Go1-RTs and signal-respond and invalid-signal
Go1-RTs in all three groups). This conclusion is further
supported by the SSRT analysis. There were no statistically
significant SSRT group differences (and the Bayes factors
were inconclusive), but there were large change-RT
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differences. In stop-change tasks, subjects first stop their
Go1 response and then execute the change response on
valid-signal trials (Verbruggen et al., 2008). Our findings
indicate that monetary incentives did not modulate the stop
process much, but they did influence the selection and/or
execution of the change response.
The absence of a reliable effect on SSRT is inconsistent
with previous studies (e.g. Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013;
see also Boehler et al., 2012, 2014). Maybe this is due to
the nature of the task, as most other studies have used stop-
signal tasks in which only one signal could occur. Fur-
thermore, in our SSRT analysis, we had to exclude many
subjects for which the assumptions of the independent race
model were violated (and as a consequence of the lower N,
the study could only detect large between-subject differ-
ences).5 Consistent with this idea, we found effects of
reward in the combined analysis. Therefore, the absence of
a statistically significant effect on SSRT in the main
experiment should be treated with caution. Note that this
does not undermine our main conclusion, namely that
incentives in our task encouraged response-slowing but did
not influence the dependence between going and stopping.
Reward and punishment have similar effects
on stop-change performance
Previous research suggests that reward and punishment
may have distinct effects on learning in response-inhibition
tasks. For example, subjects learn cue-go/no-go contin-
gencies faster when correct go responses are rewarded and
incorrect no-go responses are punished, than the other way
around (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; 2012). This could be
due to a hard-wired link between reward/punishment and
go/stop, respectively (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 2012;
Verbruggen et al., 2014). In the present study, performance
in the reward and punishment groups was very similar, and
Bayesian analyses provided support for the null hypothesis
(see also the Bayesian meta-analysis in Footnote 3). We
observed very similar results in two pilot studies in which
we observed differences between the control group and the
reward and punishment groups, but no differences between
the two incentive groups (see Supplementary Materials).
Differences in design could potentially explain the
apparent inconsistency between our study and the studies of
Guitart-Massip et al. (2011, 2012). In their work, cues pre-
sented at the beginning of the trial indicated the combination
of the go/no-go requirement and the outcome (reward/pun-
ishment). Thus, Guitart-Massip and colleagues used a very
direct mapping between action and incentive type. In our
study, there were no separate cues at the beginning of a trial,
and there was no direct mapping between individual signals
(i.e. the chequerboards), stopping, and reward/punishment
because the signal rules changed constantly. (Note that we
changed the rules because our previous work suggests that
stopping and going compete more when the demands on the
rule-based system are high; Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). In
other words, the mapping was indirect in our study, which
could explain why we did not observe a difference between
reward and punishment.
It is also possible that we did not observe any differ-
ences because the effect of local incentives may depend on
global incentives. Previous studies suggest that a match
between global incentives (e.g. avoiding losing a bonus or
obtaining a bonus) and local incentives (e.g. points
deducted for incorrect responses or points awarded for
correct responses) encourages flexible behavior, whereas a
mismatch encourages behavioral inflexibility (Maddox &
Markman, 2010). In our experiments, there was a match
between the global and local incentives in both the reward
group (subjects had to win a bonus and they could win
points on every successful valid-signal trial) and the pun-
ishment group (subjects had to avoid losing a £2.5 bonus
and they could lose points on every unsuccessful valid-
signal trial). This could explain why reward and punish-
ment had a similar effect on flexible stop-change perfor-
mance. Related to this idea, subjects in the punishment
condition started with a bonus, so they could not lose their
own money. Consequently, the main task goal could have
been similar in both groups, namely trying to maximizing
the bonus by accurate performance.
Finally, it could be argued that both conditions involved
some reward and punishment. In the punishment condition,
subjects were punished for unsuccessful trials, but prevent-
ing a loss on successful trials might have been rewarding. In
the reward group, subjects received a reward for successful
trials, but the absence of a reward on unsuccessful trials
could have been perceived as a negative event (see e.g.
Verbruggen, Chambers, Lawrence, & McLaren, 2016).
Thus, it could be argued that both the punishment and reward
groups contained some elements of reward (i.e. getting extra
points or avoiding losing points) and punishment (i.e. losing
points or not receiving extra points).
The present study cannot distinguish between these
various accounts. Therefore, future research is required to
test how different reward and punishment schemes can
influence performance in the stop task and other cognitive
paradigms.
Conclusions
The present study showed that providing monetary incen-
tives influenced both proactive slowing and reactive con-
trol (i.e. execution of a non-dominant, secondary response)
5 The study was designed to detect within–between subjects inter-
actions (see ‘‘Method’’ section).
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in a selective stop-change task. By contrast, task prioriti-
zation or the competition between going and stopping after
a signal was presented was not influenced much by
incentives. Furthermore, we found no effect of the type of
(local) incentive.
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Appendix 1
See Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6 Overview of Go1 accuracy on no-signal trials and invalid-signal trials: probability of an accurate Go1 response [p(correct)] and
probability of a missed Go1 response [p(miss)] as a function of part (first half or second half of the experiment), group (control, punishment, and
reward), and trial type (no-signal vs. invalid-signal)
p(correct) p(miss)
M SD M SD
Part 1
Control
No-signal 0.972 0.025 0.011 0.010
Invalid-signal 0.925 0.062 0.030 0.028
Punish
No-signal 0.976 0.021 0.011 0.013
Invalid-signal 0.934 0.054 0.019 0.026
Reward
No-signal 0.975 0.021 0.012 0.023
Invalid-signal 0.932 0.054 0.034 0.039
Part 2
Control
No-signal 0.972 0.028 0.012 0.014
Invalid-signal 0.956 0.035 0.020 0.024
Punish
No-signal 0.982 0.019 0.019 0.032
Invalid-signal 0.955 0.046 0.025 0.034
Reward
No-signal 0.984 0.014 0.013 0.019
Invalid-signal 0.970 0.030 0.034 0.041
Consistent with our previous research (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a, 2015), we distinguished between incorrect responses (i.e. subjects executed
an incorrect response within the response interval) and missed responses (i.e. subjects did not execute any response within the response interval).
The probability of a missed go response was generally very low, and, therefore, not further analyzed
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Appendix 2
See Table 8.
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